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ABSTRACT
The consumption of multi-ingredient foods is increasing across the globe. Traceability can be
used as a tool to gather information about and manage food safety risks associated with these
types of products. The authors investigate the choice of voluntary traceability in three-tiered
multi-ingredient food supply chains. They propose a framework based on vertical control and
agency theory to model three dimensions of traceability systems: depth, breadth, and
precision. Their analysis has three main results. First, full traceability is feasible as long as
there are net benefits to a downstream firm that demands traceability across all ingredients.
Second, horizontal network externalities are positive because an increase in the level of
traceability in one ingredient requires a similar increase in others. Finally, vertical network
effects will be positive insofar as willingness to pay and probabilities of food safety hazards
increase. [EconLit Classification: Q130, L140]. r 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
Consumers around the world are increasingly buying and consuming food products
that require minimum time spent on preparation before being consumed. These
products frequently contain multiple ingredients where different agricultural
commodities or processed inputs are combined into a final foodstuff sold directly
to consumers. Producing, processing, and supplying these products presents new and
challenging problems. Cross-contamination may increase due to bottlenecks and a
higher chance of opportunistic behavior by agents supplying the final processor.
There may be a need for identity preservation of inputs. Finally, externalities may
emerge between supply chains that in the recent past were considered independent.
Traceability systems may be used to improve the management of information
within and between firms, to respond to consumer demand, and to reduce the risk of
food safety hazards in supply chains for multi-ingredient products. Typically, the
production of multi-ingredient products involves a recipe and final quality critically
depends on the quality of the components. Examples of multi-ingredient products
abound, ranging from packed mixed salads to frozen pizzas. Implementing
traceability in supply chains for these products is a complex coordination problem
that may require new institutional arrangements.
Our goal here is to analyze the economic implications of a voluntary traceability
system in a supply chain producing multi-ingredient foods. It analyzes interfirm
traceability in multi-ingredient food production as a coordination problem, 
investigating the conditions under which none, a limited number, or all firms 
provide traceability. It models traceability as a flow of information that has 
dimensions of depth, breadth, and precision. More specifically, the objective is to 
determine the optimal level of traceability in multi-ingredient food chains and how 
this level is influenced by network effects.
In 2002, through regulation (EC) 178/2002, the European Parliament and the 
Council (2002) laid down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
created the European Food Safety Authority, and imposed procedures in matters of 
food safety. One of the measures aimed at assuring safer food is mandatory 
traceability, which became effective in January 2005. This regulation defines 
traceability as the ‘‘ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or 
substance intended to be, or expected to be incorporated into a food or feed through 
all stages of production, processing, and distribution’’ (p. 8). From this definition, it 
can be inferred that traceability implies a flow of information between firms, involves 
interfirm coordination, and covers both single and multi-ingredient foods.
Meuwissen, Velthuis, Hogeveen, and Huirne (2003) place the firm and supply 
chain within a broader European framework to improve food safety that has three 
levels. At the broadest level are the European Commission’s food safety and hygiene 
rules. Then each member state has its own specific country-level standards. Finally, 
at a more specific level, there are private standards for certification. Folbert and 
Dagevos (2000) suggest that European Union (EU) consumers and legislators are 
concerned not only with the safety of foods, but also with how food is obtained. 
Thus, safety is not the sole motivator for traceability adoption. It may also correct 
market failures, reduce costs of identification of origins of products, and reduce 
transaction costs (Hobbs, 2004; Hobbs, Bailey, Dickinson, & Haghiri, 2005). This 
may explain why traceability is being so widely adopted in Europe and why retailers 
in the EU are pushing for more stringent systems than required by legislation.
Information is a valuable asset for firms (Sporleder & Moss, 2002). It facilitates 
trade and can lead to considerable efficiencies throughout the supply chain. 
Consumers and firms may be willing to pay a premium for information. 
A traceability system is a tool through which information flowing among parties 
in a supply chain can be more effectively and efficiently managed. It can also 
improve logistics operations and minimize the impact of food safety hazards (Hobbs, 
2004; Meuwissen et al., 2003). However, traceability is costly, as it requires 
gathering, storing, and sharing information. In addition, its benefits may not be 
evenly distributed across the supply chain, which may lead to the adoption of 
suboptimal traceability. It is therefore of critical importance to analyze the 
coordination, structural, and institutional implications of traceability adoption.
2. OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES
TO TRACEABILITY ANALYSIS
There is already a sizable literature on the economics of traceability systems. Moe 
(1998) distinguishes two types of traceability: chain traceability tracks a batch and its 
history through production, transport, storage, processing, distribution, and sales. 
Internal traceability documents all production processes within a firm. Although the 
economic studies on traceability generally focus on the first type, operations research
and management science studies have focused on implementation of internal 
traceability.
In operations research and management science, traceability is seen as an 
information system devised to coordinate information between different divisions 
within a firm. For example, Dupuy, Botta-Genoulaz, and Guinet (2005) use an 
operations research approach to improve a traceability system. They formulate an 
optimization problem that minimizes the size of recalled production batches. 
Similarly, Jansen-Veullers, van Dorp, and Beulens (2003) present a solution for an 
information management system within a firm to support traceability. Their system 
integrates process, control, information, and information infrastructure layers.
Hofstede (2002) discusses transparency in netchains, defined as a new inter-
disciplinary field of research derived from technology and information systems on 
the one hand and social sciences on the other. The concept combines network and 
supply chain management approaches, mixed with economics and other social 
sciences. Hofstede argues that the formation of netchains is associated with the need 
to exchange goods and money, but he also points out how critical information is and 
argues it constitutes the life force of netchains.
Trienekens and Beulens (2001) suggest that only part of the information generated 
by a supplier about its products and processes is passed down to the buyer. The 
information flow is decoupled from the product flow, which implies that only an 
aggregate level of information moves with the product along the supply chain. The 
challenge is then to devise a way to maintain the relation between the aggregate 
information transferred and the detailed information retained by the supplier.
The importance of the operations research literature is that it clearly relates 
traceability to information systems. This perspective envisions the construction of a 
traceability system as an optimization problem aiming to govern the flow of 
information between different departments of a firm. When considering the case for 
traceability implementation along a food chain, it may be more appropriate to 
approach it as a network problem. The analysis of traceability in this article builds 
on the operations research insights, but takes an economics approach.
The economics perspective on traceability has two fundamental streams: the 
demand and supply sides. From the demand side the main problem is to determine 
consumer’s willingness to pay for traceability. Dickinson and Bailey (2002) find that 
American consumers are willing to pay a premium for traceability in beef and pork 
sandwiches. Hobbs et al. (2005) obtain similar results when using experimental 
auctions in the United States and Canada to determine consumer willingness to pay 
for traceability in beef and pork. Banterle and Stranieri (2008) find that a majority of 
consumers they surveyed in Italy said that having a mandatory traceability code on 
fresh meat is important. Moreover, they find that 84% of the respondents mentioned 
that beef labelling should mention the country of origin of the animal. As yet, there 
are no similar surveys on the willingness to pay for and interest in traceability in 
multi-ingredient foods.
In this article, we analyze the economics of the supply of traceability systems for 
multi-ingredient foods. The economic impacts of traceability adoption in food chains 
have only recently started to be played out. Hobbs (2004) focuses on the role of 
traceability in the food system and distinguishes ‘‘ex post reactive systems that allow 
the traceback of affected products in the event of a contamination problem so as to 
minimize social costs, ex post systems that facilitate the allocation of liability, and
1Meuwissen et al. (2003) write in the context of the EU where there is a limited liability rule. In the
United States where a strict liability rule prevails this may not necessarily be the case.
information systems that provide ex ante quality verification’’ (p. 397). Traceability 
has three main functions: (a) reduce costs associated with risks of food safety 
occurrences, (b) strengthen liability incentives, and (c) allow for ex ante verification 
of credence quality attributes.
Meuwissen et al. (2003) identify three key questions: What is the breakeven point 
for levels of traceability? What are the impacts of traceability on current liability and 
recall insurance schemes? How can regulatory incentives avoid free-riding? They 
offer an overview of potential costs and benefits of traceability and certification in 
meat supply chains. Traceability costs are associated with system implementation 
(e.g., changes in procedures, decreased flexibility, and increased levels of automation, 
inventory, personnel, and documentation) and maintenance (through auditing). The 
benefits include increased transparency, reduced risk of liability claims,1 more 
effective recalls, enhanced logistics, improved control of livestock epidemics, possible 
positive effects on trade, easier product licensing, and possible price premiums.
According to Golan et al. (2004), in Europe traceability has mainly been motivated 
by regulations; in the United States it tends to be solely motivated by market 
conditions. They survey several different systems of traceability in agri-food 
industries and characterize them using three dimensions: depth (how far up and 
downstream the system goes), breadth (how many attributes are traced), and 
precision (e.g., to what extent the origin is correctly identified). Golan et al. (2004) 
find that there is no single best way to introduce traceability and there is a large 
variability in the characteristics of systems within and across industries, depending 
on specific attributes of products or motivations to introduce traceability. They also 
suggest that it is impossible to have full traceability in food, regardless of mandatory 
or voluntary systems, and that choices have to be made on which attributes will be 
traceable.
Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2004) use a principal-agent model approach to 
analyze the implications of introducing traceability in a food supply chain where 
there is an inspection protocol. The producer is the agent and knows how safe the 
product is; the processor (the principal) does not know the quality and safety of the 
product. The processor wants to offer a price that maximizes his profit while forcing 
the producer to deliver information and a safe product.
Additional recent research has focused on different aspects of relationships 
between traceability, inspection, and incentives, including liability, in producing 
quality for single-ingredient products. Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2007) propose a 
principal-agent model where traceability is an exogenous variable that influences the 
nature of contractual relations between agents in the supply chain. Traceability may 
or not be demanded in the contract depending on inspection failure costs and the 
possibility of identifying unsafe producers. Pouliot and Summer (2008) model the 
supply of safe food in a two-stage marketing channel, where homogeneous farms sell 
output to homogenous marketers who, in turn, sell to consumers. When traceability 
is not available, firms are anonymous and may free-ride on producers of safer food. 
Unsafe food can originate either at the farm or marketer levels and food-safety 
incidents increase in the number of firms in the supply chain and with imperfect 
traceability systems. Finally, Resende-Filho and Buhr (2008) propose a principal-
agent model where the choice of investment in traceability depends on the benefits 
from linking cattle feeder practices with the quality of retail beef cuts. They find that 
the larger investment costs are the higher is the rate of traceback success. However, 
the lowest traceback success rate studied is the optimal choice for packers. These 
results indicate important factors to be considered in analyzing the performance of 
traceability systems for single-ingredient products.
Implementing traceability in multi-ingredient food chains involves the coordina-
tion of several different firms. Traceability is an information management tool and 
its effectiveness and efficiency may be affected by information asymmetries and 
imperfections. As in Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2004), we use a principal-agent 
model, but in our case we analyze traceability as an endogenous variable.
To model traceability in multi-ingredient food chains we combine a model of 
vertical control proposed by Royer (1998) with agency theory. Royer’s model 
provides a way to relate and transfer information between firms, whereas agency 
theory provides a governance structure to manage the flow of information. Our 
analysis assumes that the costs of traceability to a firm, namely those of designing, 
implementing, and operating an internal information system, are given. It departs 
from previous analysis on the economics of traceability by proposing a three-tiered 
supply chain model to analyze the choice of traceability in multi-ingredient products 
and by modeling traceability as a level of information rather than a zero-one choice. 
We analyze the conditions for no, partial, or full traceability and investigate the 
impact of network effects on optimal traceability levels.
3. A MODEL OF VOLUNTARY TRACEABILITY IN A MULTI-INGREDIENT 
SUPPLY CHAIN
Food supply chains involve a large number of firms, taking different actions in 
different tiers of the chain. Globalization has brought increasing complexity to food 
networks. In today’s global chains, there are vertical and horizontal links between 
different firms at any giving point in a supply chain. In this section, we propose to 
model a traceability system in a three-tiered chain governed by contracts. The 
network structure in our model corresponds to the type ‘‘B’’ traceability system 
proposed in Meuwissen et al. (2003), where at each tier of the supply chain there 
must be traceability from every upstream firm in the chain.
Figure 1 shows the structure of the supply chain that we model. The firm in the 
third tier downstream is a producer of a multi-ingredient product, for example, a 
pizza, and buys ingredients (e.g., cheese or tomato paste) from different intermediate 
processors (e.g., cheese or tomato paste producers) in the second tier. To produce the 
ingredients, firms in the second tier purchase inputs (e.g., milk or tomatoes) from 
farmers in the first tier. Each firm in the first and second tiers is specialized, 
producing a single output and related information. The second-tier firms depend on 
inputs supplied by a single and specialized supplier in the first tier. Hence, each firm 
has only one link within the network structure. For instance if farm a11 produces 
tomatoes, it will sell only to the tomato paste processor a21. Agents in the first tier 
can be thought of either as a single farm or as a producer’s organization, e.g., a 
cooperative. Note that within the same tier of the supply chain there is hetero-
geneity in hazards and costs of traceability across firms producing different 
ingredients (e.g., milk vs. tomatoes, cheese vs. tomato paste). There is also
heterogeneity between firms in the same ingredient supply chain across tiers (e.g.,
milk vs. cheese, tomatoes vs. tomato paste). This heterogeneity will result in
differences in the level of traceability provided by firms.
3.1. Assumptions
In the context of this article traceability is voluntary, which implies that every firm in
the food chain has the option not to adopt traceability. Trinekens and Beulens (2001)
argue that information flows in traceability systems must relate to product flows,
they also claim that the flows do not have to occur simultaneously and may even be
decoupled. In this article, we assume that the product and information are
decoupled. We also assume that information can be contracted independently.
Early articles on the economics of traceability model it as a discrete choice; a firm
either has it or not (Hobbs, 2004). Golan et al. (2004) define traceability as
multidimensional (depth, breadth, and precision), and many researchers (see, e.g.,
Starbird & Amanor-Boadu, 2007; Pouliot & Sumner, 2008) embrace this definition;
nevertheless, most models and empirical work to date treat traceability as one-
dimensional. For example, Pouliot and Sumner (2008) define the degree of
traceability as the probability of correctly identifying the source of a food product.
However, as the Golan et al. definition suggests, traceability systems can carry
information on multiple attributes (e.g., safety, organic production processes), at
different depths (e.g., two-tier vs. three-tier supply chains), and with different levels
of precision.
Here we define the level of traceability as the precision of information provided by
each firm in the supply chain; the higher the level of traceability the more accurate
will be information on a given food product. The level of precision can reflect, for
example, the size of the lot to which the information refers. Additionally our
framework includes a measure of depth (the number of traceable vertical links in the
chain) and breadth (the number of ingredients for which there will be traceability).
γ11
a21 a2n… … 
… …a11 a1i a1n 
a2i 
γ1nγ1i
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Figure 1 Network structure of a multi-ingredient food traceability system.
We assume that traceability can be decomposed into units of information. Each 
unit increases the precision of information and has the same monetary value. 
Although our definition of the traceability level is novel, Goldsmith and Bender 
(2004) argue that there is a continuum for the value of identity preservation. This 
implies that for some products (e.g., organic foods) having more identity 
information is valuable; for others (e.g., commodities) it is not. The following 
assumptions are used in developing the model.
Assumption 1: Firms maximize profits and they can profit from traceability. Firms 
get compensation for additional units of traceability they provide; hence, profits are 
the difference between the revenues from traceability and its respective costs. When 
firms accept a contract to provide traceability, they may get a premium per unit of 
traceability exchanged downstream.
Assumption 2: To have traceability for a multi-ingredient food, the risk neutral 
third-tier firm offers a contract to each ingredient producer in the second tier. Risk 
neutrality is a standard assumption in principal-agent models and implies that the 
principal does not require a rent for bearing the risk. In contrast, a risk-averse third-
tier firm would require more traceability to decrease the food safety losses; the 
opposite would be expected if the third-tier firm is a risk-seeker.
The contract specifies the levels of traceability each firm in the first and second tiers 
must provide and the respective compensation. Thus, there are two sets of contracts: 
first, the third-tier firm offers a contract to second-tier firms, which, in turn, propose 
a contract to farmers in the first tier. Each contract calls for a specific level of 
traceability. Thus, there is heterogeneity across ingredients and tiers (e.g., the level of 
information required for fresh tomatoes is different from that for milk, which, in 
turn, is different from that required for tomato paste or cheese). However, we 
assume homogeneity between firms in the same tier producing the same ingredient. 
For example, the contract for fresh tomatoes is the same for every producer selling to 
a tomato paste processor. First- and second-tier firms have a choice in taking a 
contract requiring traceability because they have an outside option of selling their 
output in a spot market.
Assumption 3: Traceability levels are additive and each unit of information has the 
same value. Traceability is a vertical and downstream flow of information. 
Traceability levels are denoted as g. Subscripts identify the location of firms in the 
supply chain: The first subscript identifies the tier where the firm is located; the 
second identifies a given firm. For example, g1i identifies the level of traceability 
chosen by the ith firm in the first tier. To have traceability and create new 
information, downstream firms must offer a contract to obtain traceability 
upstream. Thus, assume a linearly increasing chain relationship between upstream
and downstream traceability levels, i.e., g3 ¼ g3ðg21; . . . ; g2nÞ, g2i ¼ g2iðg1iÞ, 
g0340; g3
00 ¼ 0, and g02i40; g200i ¼ 0(I 5 1,y,n). Note that the third-tier level of 
traceability is indirectly impacted by each first-tier firm. Further assume that if no 
information is gathered upstream, it is impossible for second- and third-tier firms to
have traceability, thus, g2ið0Þ ¼  0(I 5 1,y,n) and g3ð0Þ ¼  0.
Assumption 4: The first- and second-tier firms receive a price premium p per unit 
of traceability provided when they take a contract. The premium is only for the level 
of traceability corresponding to the output sold by each firm in the first and second 
tiers, profits from output sales are entirely captured in the fixed profits term. This is 
consistent with the idea of Hobbs (2004) who suggests that traceability can bring a
‘‘goodwill premium plus a premium due to greater consumer confidence’’ (p. 401). 
Furthermore, several studies analyzing the demand for traceability conducted in the 
United States, Canada, and Spain suggest that consumers are willing to pay a 
premium or assign a positive value to traceability (Gracia & Zeballos, 2005; Hobbs 
et al., 2005). Again, subscripts identify the tier and the firm receiving the premium. 
For instance, p21 is the premium for the traceability level g21 provided by Firm 1 in 
the second tier to the third tier. Note that the premiums paid to the first- and second-
tier firms are endogenous variables, but given Assumption 1 above, the premium p3 
paid by consumers to the third-tier firm is exogenous.
Assumption 5: Traceability is costly, as each firm has to invest in an internal 
information system to obtain and transfer information. Hobbs (2004) mentions five 
different costs: the direct costs of the traceability system, the impact of due diligence 
decisions on production costs, and three additional costs that are incurred only if a 
safety problem occurs. The logistics and operations research literature suggests there 
are internal costs when implementing an information system to support traceability 
(Goldsmith & Bender, 2004; Jansen-Veullers et al., 2003; Velthuis, Mourits, & 
Hogeveen, 2008; Vernede, Verdenius, & Broeze, 2003). Here costs of traceability are 
denoted as c, subscripts are then used to identify the location of the firm in the food 
chain. We assume the costs of traceability are increasing and convex with units of 
information, i.e., c ¼ cðg); c040, and c0040. Furthermore, to simplify the analysis 
assume that information systems are compatible across firms. This implies that there 
is no additional cost linked to compatibility and transfer costs are zero.
Assumption 6: Meuwissen et al. (2003) suggest that ‘‘traceability systems require a 
credible and complete information (in the sense of what has been agreed on) system 
along all participants in the supply chain’’ (p. 169). Here we assume that the cost of 
providing traceability is common knowledge and the principal has full information 
on the types of agents and their effort levels. Relaxing these assumptions would 
complicate contract design and lead to information rents. We further assume that 
when firms take a contract to provide traceability downstream that all traceable 
information is true.
Assumption 7: Along with consumer demand, traceability may be motivated by 
the need to mitigate exposure to losses linked to food safety hazards. Hobbs (2004) 
states that ‘‘y a liability cost is imposed on firms that have not exhibited due 
diligence in reducing the potential for a food hazard problem’’ (p. 402). Meuwissen 
et al. (2003) commenting on the new EU food laws argue, ‘‘food safety is the primary 
responsibility of food producers’’ (p. 167). Here we assume the third-tier firm may 
incur a liability loss (L) in the event of a food safety hazard, which occurs with 
probability c 2 ½0; 1. However, the loss can be mitigated if there is traceability. 
Assume that losses decrease at an increasing rate with traceability levels from the
third-tier firm, i.e., L ¼ Lðg3Þ; L0o0; and L0040; further assume that if the third-
tier firm does not adopt traceability, it faces the maximum possible loss.
3.2. Model
The model explores the general conditions for the voluntary adoption of no, partial, 
or full traceability in a three-tiered multi-ingredient supply chain. The problem of 
each firm in the supply chain is introduced starting with firms in the first tier. In this 
tier, each firm produces a different commodity, and thus has different information to
Max
g1i
1i ¼ p1ig1i  c1iðg1iÞ ð1Þ
The first term denotes the total revenue from traceability; the second represents the
costs of traceability for the first-tier firm producing the ith ingredient. Of course, in
real transactions there are no contracts for just the provision of traceability. The
choice of traceability can be seen as part of a larger contract where all other clauses
of the contractual arrangement are held constant.
To supply traceable ingredients downstream, each second-tier firm must propose a
contract to obtain traced commodities from the corresponding first-tier firm. Note
that second-tier firms are simultaneously a principal and an agent. Again, each firm
in the second tier produces a different ingredient, which may have a different value
and require different traceability levels. Consider the case of the second-tier firm
producing the ith ingredient, which is produced from the ith commodity obtained
upstream. From Assumption 3 above, to provide a traceable ingredient to the third-
tier firm, a second-tier firm must have traceability from a first-tier firm to which it
offers a contract. The first-tier firm will only accept a contract if it gets at least its
reservation utility, here assumed to be zero. Thus, the ith first-tier firm’s
participation constraint is given by
p1ig1i  c1iðg1iÞ ð2Þ
From this expression, the second-tier firm sets the premium per traceability level
assuring participation from the first-tier firm. Note that in this model the first-tier
firm takes a contract if the premium for traceability set by the second-tier firm
corresponds to the average costs of traceability. To assure the first-tier firm provides
the level of traceability (g1i) set in the contract, the ith second-tier firm sets the
following payment scheme.
p1i ¼
c1iðg1iÞ
g1i
if g1i  g1i
0 if g1iog1i
8><
>: ð3Þ
This payment scheme implies that the participation constraint binds, which is the
case given Assumption 6 on full and complete information. The upper term in the
curled bracket is derived from the participation constraint in Equation (2) and states
that the ith first-tier firm will receive p1i for providing the contracted level of
traceability g1i. The second term corresponds to the incentive compatibility
constraint and can be seen as a punishment for breaking the contractual level of
traceability. Note that the second-tier firm has no incentive to pay more than the
average costs of traceability, whereas the first-tier firm will get no benefit from
providing more than the contracted level of traceability. Thus, the payment scheme
in Equation (3) provides incentives for the provision of an efficient level of
traceability.
insert in the traceability system. However, they face a similar problem of deciding 
whether to take a contract from the second-tier firm based on the revenues and costs 
of traceability. The first-tier firm producing the ith commodity has the following 
objective function.
The problem of the second-tier firm producing the ith ingredient is formulated as
Max
g2i
2i ¼p2ig2i  p1ig1i  c2iðg2iÞ
s:t:: g2i ¼g2iðg1iÞ
p1i 
c1iðg1iÞ
g1i
ð4Þ
where p2i denotes the compensation paid by the third-tier firm for the level of
traceability g2i, and c2i are the costs of traceability incurred by the second-tier firm.
Second-tier firms are conditioned in two ways. The first is through the chain
relationship and dependency constraint associated with traceability levels. This
constraint is similar to those used in vertical models to assure a flow of goods across
vertically linked firms (Royer, 1998). The second is by the participation and incentive
compatibility constraints that are used to assure first-tier firms provide the levels of
traceability agreed to in their respective contracts.
Given that the participation constraint binds under the payment scheme in
Equation (3), the problem of the second-tier firm can be reformulated substituting
the constraints into the objective function:
Max
g1i
2i ¼ p2ig2iðg1iÞ  c1iðg1iÞ  c2iðg2iðg1iÞÞ ð5Þ
Following Dickinson and Bailey (2002), assume that consumers are willing to pay
a premium (p3) for traceability. To assure this information to consumers, the
downstream firm must offer a contract for the provision of traceability to at least one
ingredient producer in the second tier. The traceability level offered by the third-tier
firm depends on a vector of traceability levels across inputs from the second tier.
Recall that though the number of traceable links denotes the depth of the system and
the number of ingredients traced its breadth, the level of traceability is associated
with the precision of information in the traceability system. From Assumption 7,
along with consumer willingness to pay, the third-tier firm demands traceability
upstream to mitigate liability losses associated with food safety hazards. The
different ingredients may have different probabilities of causing a hazard. For
instance, cheese may have a higher risk of contamination than flour. Thus,
heterogeneity between firms in the tier comes from the fact they produce different
ingredients and it is unlikely that the costs of traceability are identical across
products. Each firm in the same tier is distinct and may be required to provide
different levels of traceability to the third-tier firm. This point is well documented in
Golan et al. (2004) who find different traceability systems across food industries. In
this model, rather than operating in isolation each industry is linked downstream
through supplying the same buyer.
Suppose that the third-tier firm offers a contract to the second-tier firm producing
the ith ingredient. This firm will only take a contract if it gets its reservation utility,
again assumed to be zero, i.e.,
p2ig2i  p1ig1i1c2iðg2iÞ ð6Þ
This expression says that unless the third-tier firm offers a contract for traceability
to the ith second-tier firm such that its revenue at least compensates for costs of
traceability incurred by the second-tier firm, a contract will not be accepted. From
Equation (6), it can be seen that compensation to second-tier firms per level of

2i
p2i ¼
p1ig1i1c2iðg2iÞ
g2
if g2i  g2i
0 if g2iog2i
8><
>: ð7Þ
As in the case of the contract offered by second-tier firms upstream, the first condition
is the participation constraint derived from Equation (6); the second is the incentive
compatibility constraint ensuring the second-tier firm will offer the traceability level set
in the contract or have a zero premium. Again note that from Assumption 6, this
payment scheme assures an efficient level of traceability because the third-tier firm does
not have to pay more than the average cost of traceability and the second-tier firm is not
paid above its costs for providing an additional level of traceability.
The problem of the third-tier firm is quite complex, as this firm must design a set of
contracts to obtain traceability from up to n different firms in the second tier. This
denotes the breadth of the system, which in this model is the number of ingredients.
Furthermore, given Assumption 3 on the chain relationship between traceability
levels, the third-tier firm is further constrained by the provision of traceability by
first-tier firms to second-tier firms. Let g1 and g2 represent column vectors with n
elements each corresponding to traceability levels from each firm in the first and
second tiers, respectively. The objective function of the third-tier firm is
Max
g3
E½3 ¼p3g3 
Xn
i¼1
p2ig2i  c3ðg3Þ  cLðg3Þ
s:t:: g3 ¼g3ðG2Þ
g21 ¼g21ðg11Þ; . . . ; g2n ¼ g2nðg1nÞ
G1 0
p21 
p11g111c21ðg21Þ
g11
; . . . ; p2n 
p1ng1n1c2nðg2nÞ
g1n
p11 
c11ðg11Þ
g11
; . . . ; p1n 
c1nðg1nÞ
g1n
ð8Þ
In this expression, p3 is the premium paid to the third-tier firm for providing
traceability, the remaining notation is as defined above. These are expected total
profits because the expression includes a probability of a food safety event. The
third-tier firm has to consider a larger number of constraints. The participation
constraints bind by the payment schemes in Equations (3) and (7) specified above.
Thus, we can sequentially substitute the constraints for the first-tier firm into the
corresponding second-tier firm’s problem and then into the third-tier firm’s problem,
yielding
Max
G1
3 ¼p3g3ðg21ðg11Þ; . . . ; g2nðg1nÞÞ 
Xn
i¼1
c1iðg1iÞ1
Xn
i¼1
c2iðg2iðg1iÞÞ
" #
 c3ðg3ðg21ðg11Þ; . . . ; g2nðg1nÞÞÞ  cLðg3ðg21ðg11Þ; . . . ; g2nðg1nÞÞÞ
s:t:: G1  0 ð9Þ
traceability must equal at least the average costs. Additionally, to ensure that the
contractual level of traceability ðg Þ is provided by the second-tier firm producing the 
ith ingredient, the third-tier firm sets the following payment scheme.
@3
@g1i
¼ 0 ) p3
@g3ðÞ
@g2i
g02i  cL0ðÞg02i
@g3ðÞ
@g2i
¼ c01i1c02ig02i1c03ðÞg02i
@g3ðÞ
@g2i
ð10Þ
The left-hand side of the second equality shows the indirect marginal benefits of
having traceability from the ith firm. There are two marginal benefits: The first is the
effect on an additional premium and the second is the reduction in expected marginal
loss due to food safety hazards. Although the expected marginal loss term has a
negative sign, recall that by Assumption 7 the value of the liability loss decreases
with traceability. The right-hand side shows the aggregate marginal costs of
traceability borne by each firm in each tier involved in the production of the ith
ingredient. The contracted levels of traceability for the corresponding second-tier
firms and the third-tier firm are derived using the constraints of the problem of the
third-tier firm and the levels of traceability for each first-tier firm. Then, using the
participation constraints, the premiums offered in the contracts proposed to second-
and first-tier firms are also obtained. This problem has 2ðn1nÞ11 endogenous
variables and two exogenous variables (the premium for traceability paid by
consumers and the probability of a food safety hazard).
To assure that the necessary conditions implicitly define the optimal levels of
traceability that maximize the expected profit function, the second-order condition
must be checked. This involves evaluation of the Hessian matrix for the profit
maximization as shown below.
H ¼
@23=@g211    @23=@g11@g1i    @23=@g11@g1n
..
. . .
. ..
.    ...
@23=@g11    @23=@g21i    @23=@g1i@g1n
..
.    ... . .. ...
@23=@g11@g1n    @23=@g1i@g1n    @23=@g21n
2
6666664
3
7777775
ð11Þ
Because the expected profit function is concave, for the necessary conditions to
define a maximum, the Hessian must be negative semidefinite; it will be if
ð1ÞnjHnj40. An alternative way to assess whether the first-order conditions define
a maximum of the profit function is to use the mathematical theorem relating the
shape of the function to its extreme points. This theorem says that if a function is
concave, then its extreme point is a maximum (Baldani, Bradfield, & Turner, 1996).
Because the revenue from traceability is linear, the costs and the expected loss
functions are convex (by Assumptions 5 and 7, respectively), and the traceability
functions are linearly increasing, the profit function is concave. Thus, the first-order
This problem has n necessary conditions, leading to n optimal levels of traceability 
for the commodities produced by first-tier firms. Because of the functional 
relationship between up- and downstream traceability levels and full information, 
the third-tier firm sets the level of traceability for each ingredient upstream. This 
defines the depth (through the tiers of the system), breadth (whether ingredients have 
traceability), and precision (the optimal level of traceability) for the system. Given 
space limitations, only the necessary condition for setting the level of traceability 
provided by the first-tier firm producing the ith commodity that maximizes the first-
tier firm’s expected profits is shown.
g11  0;
@3
@g11
 0 and @3
@g11
g11¼ 0
..
. ..
. ..
.
g1n  0;
@3
@g1n
 0 and @3
@g1n
g1n¼ 0
ð12Þ
Each of these conditions must hold simultaneously. There will be a border solution
for the provision of traceability from each first-tier firm if marginal profits to the
third-tier firm decrease as traceability levels become positive. This occurs when the
first Kuhn–Tucker condition binds and the second holds as a strict inequality. In this
case, there is no traceability because the third-tier firm will not adopt traceability and
no contracts are offered to firms in the first and second tiers. If at least one first-order
condition binds, a positive level of traceability is provided for a limited number of
ingredients and there will be partial adoption of traceability. Finally, if all the
necessary conditions bind, there will be full traceability with every ingredient used in
the production of the multi-ingredient product of the third-tier firm being traceable
and every firm in the first and second tiers getting a contract to provide traceability.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
An important issue in the economics of traceability adoption is whether it is
desirable and efficient to have full traceability. In the context of this study, full
traceability is defined as having traceability from the first-tier in the food chain for
every ingredient used by the third-tier firm producing the final output. The previous
section discusses the conditions for no, partial, or full traceability in the general
case. Here we illustrate our general results using the case of a supply chain for a
product composed of three ingredients and focusing on the optimizing condition of
the third-tier firm (i.e., n5 3, g25 g21, g22, g23 and g15 g11, g12, g13). This example is
further used to illustrate horizontal and vertical network effects on the optimal
level of information contracted for with first-tier firms. In our context, network
effects are indirect and due to complementarities across levels of traceability
for each ingredient. The results of this case study can be generalized to
the n ingredient case above. However, the more ingredients are considered the
larger are the computational requirements. Once the constraints are substituted into
the model with three ingredients, the third-tier firm maximizes expected profits now
defined as
Max
G1
E½3 ¼p3g3ðg21ðg11Þ; g22ðg12Þ; g23ðg13ÞÞ 
X3
i¼1
c1iðg1iÞ1
X3
i¼1
c2iðg2iðg1iÞÞ
" #
 c3ðg3ðg21ðg11Þ; g22ðg12Þ; g23ðg13ÞÞÞ  cLðg3ðg21ðg11Þ; g22ðg12Þ; g23ðg13ÞÞÞ
s:t:: G1  0 ð13Þ
conditions implicitly define the optimal level of traceability that each first-tier firm 
must provide.
To examine whether traceability is feasible, we check border solutions looking at 
the Kuhn–Tucker conditions:
@E½3
@g11
¼ 0 ) p3 @g3ðÞ
@g21
g021  cL0ðÞg021
@g3ðÞ
@g21
¼ c0111c021g0211c03ðÞg021
@g3ðÞ
@g21
ð14Þ
@E½3
@g12
¼ 0 ) p3
@g3ðÞ
@g22
g022  cL0ðÞg022
@g3ðÞ
@g22
¼ c0121c022g0221c03ðÞg022
@g3ðÞ
@g22
ð15Þ
@E½3
@g13
¼ 0 ) p3 @g3ðÞ
@g23
g023  cL0ðÞg023
@g3ðÞ
@g23
¼ c0131c023g0231c03ðÞg023
@g3ðÞ
@g23
ð16Þ
Provided that the sufficient condition for maximum expected profits is met, solving
Equations (14)–(16) simultaneously yields the optimal choices of traceability for each
first-tier firm. These are a function of consumer willingness to pay for traceability (p3)
and the probability (c) of a food safety hazard. Once the optimal levels of traceability
provided by each first-tier firm are set, the remaining endogenous variables are
defined using the constraints for the third-tier firm. Table 1 summarizes the
compensation and traceability levels that would be offered in the contracts between
the third-tier and each second-tier firm, and between them and the first-tier firms.
Along with the objective function Equation (13), Table 1 shows that the higher the
level of traceability for each ingredient, the higher the costs incurred by the third-tier
firm. This leads to the question of whether this firm will choose to have no, partial,
or full traceability.
Traceability is feasible if the third-tier firm offers a contract with the payment
scheme in Equation (7) to at least one of the firms in the second tier, which, in turn,
must offer a contract to the corresponding first-tier firm. As every ingredient is
TABLE 1. Traceability Levels and Premiums Along the Supply Chain
Firms Compensation Traceability level
First-tier
contracts
11
p
11
¼ c11ðg11ðp3;cÞÞ
g11ðp3;cÞ
g11 ¼ g11ðp3;cÞ
12
p
12
¼ c12ðg12ðp3;cÞÞ
g12ðp3;cÞ
g12 ¼ g12ðp3;cÞ
13
p
13
¼ c13ðg13ðp3;cÞÞ
g13ðp3;cÞ
g13 ¼ g13ðp3;cÞ
Second-tier
contracts
21
p
21
¼ c11ðg11ðÞÞ1c21ðg21ðg11ðÞÞÞ
g21ðg11ðÞÞ
g21 ¼ g21ðg11ðp3;cÞÞ
22
p
22
¼ c12ðg12ðÞÞ1c22ðg22ðg12ðÞÞÞ
g22ðg12ðÞÞ
g22 ¼ g22ðg12ðp3;cÞÞ
23
p
23
¼ c13ðg13ðÞÞ1c23ðg23ðg13ðÞÞÞ
g23ðg13ðÞÞ
g23 ¼ g23ðg13ðp3;cÞÞ
Third-tier
contracts
3 p3 g3 ¼ g3ðg21ðg11ðÞÞ;
g22ðg12ðÞÞ; g23ðg13ðÞÞÞ
The first-order necessary conditions for the maximization of expected profits for 
the third-tier firm are
g1i  0;
@E½3
@g1i
 0; and @E½3
@g1i
g1i ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2; 3 ð17Þ
Proposition 1: If the marginal costs of having traceability from every firm in the
first-tier exceed the marginal benefits to the third-tier firm, then traceability is not
implemented.
Traceability is not implemented if there are border solutions to each of the first-
order conditions Equations (14)–(16). From the Kuhn–Tucker conditions in
Equation (17), the third-tier firm has no incentive to adopt traceability if for each
ingredient the marginal expected profits are decreasing as traceability becomes
positive. In other words, traceability is not feasible if the sum of the premium paid by
consumers and the marginal expected risk mitigation from having traceability does
not cover its aggregate marginal costs along the supply chain.
Verbeke (2005) suggests that consumers may face an overload of information and be
unable to understand the information provided by single-ingredient traceability
systems. Consumers may find it even harder to use information provided by traceability
systems for multi-ingredient foods, which may hinder willingness to pay for traceability
in these products. It may also be harder to assess the food safety risks of each ingredient
used in a recipe for a multi-ingredient food, leading to uncertainties about how
traceability could mitigate those risks. These factors pose challenges for the voluntary
implementation of any traceability in supply chains for multi-ingredient foods.
Proposition 2: Partial traceability will occur if, for at least one ingredient, the
marginal benefits to the third-tier firm equal the marginal costs incurred along the
food chain.
Suppose that for one of the three ingredients considered the marginal profits from
traceability are zero. This occurs if for at least one of the first-order conditions
Equations (14)–(16) there is a positive level of traceability or, in other words, there is
an interior solution for the choice of traceability for at least one ingredient.
There are a number of reasons to have only partial traceability in multi-ingredient food
supply chains. The third-tier firm may know from risk assessment reports that not all
ingredients used in the recipe are equally hazardous. Because the costs of implementing
traceability rise with the number of ingredients traced, firms may use these assessments to
decide to have traceability for a limited number of ingredients. Additionally, although
consumers may not be willing to pay for the costs of having traceability for all the
ingredients in a food product, they may be aware that certain ingredients are more
hazardous and be willing to pay a premium for having traceability for them.
Proposition 3: Full traceability will emerge if each of the three providers of
ingredients to the third-tier firm and each of the first-tier firms supplying them
accepts a contract for the provision of traceability downstream.
Full traceability requires the existence of an interior solution for each of the
necessary conditions Equations (14)–(16). In terms of the Kuhn–Tucker conditions
in Equation (17), this requires that for each ingredient the first equation holds as a
distinct with different production processes, they will have distinct traceability levels 
and premiums. Furthermore, as risks differ from one ingredient to another, their 
respective traceability levels will have different impacts on loss mitigation. Also, note 
that though additional levels of upstream traceability have an indirect impact on 
benefits, they directly affect costs. The following propositions are presented for this 
analysis. This discussion is based on the Kuhn–Tucker conditions.
Max
g11
3 ¼ p3g3ðg21ðg11Þ; g22ðg12Þ; g23ðg13ÞÞ 
X3
i¼1
c1iðg1iÞ1
X3
i¼1
c2iðg2iðg1iÞÞ
" #
c3ðg3ðg21ðg11Þ; g22ðg12Þ; g23ðg13ÞÞÞcLðg3ðg21ðg11Þ; g22ðg12Þ; g23ðg13ÞÞÞ
s:t:: g11; g12; g13  0 ð18Þ
The semicolon separates the traceability levels for the second and third ingredients,
which are now exogenous. The first-order necessary condition for maximization of
expected profits is
@3
@g11
¼0)p3
@g3ðÞ
@g21
g021cL0ðÞg021
@g3ðÞ
@g21
¼c0111c021g0211c03ðÞg021
@g3ðÞ
@g21
ð19Þ
This expression implicitly defines the optimal level of traceability for ingredient 1
from the first-tier as a function of the traceability levels on ingredients 2 and 3,
the premium paid by consumers, and the probability of a food safety hazard,
strict inequality, whereas the remaining equations bind. In this case, and if the 
second-order condition is met, each first-tier firm receives a contract from the 
corresponding second-tier firm to provide the level of traceability that maximizes the 
third-tier firm’s expected profits. Similarly, each second-tier firm receives a contract 
from the third-tier firm setting a level of traceability and an appropriate premium.
In some cases, the production of ingredients may involve processes that mingle the 
inputs to the ingredient in such a way that it becomes virtually impossible to maintain 
a flow of information. For example, milk from different producers may be mixed in a 
tank before arriving at a cheese processor making the linkage between a cheese output 
and the farm on which the milk originated less precise. In such cases, the level of 
traceability may have an upper bound. However, unless there is traceability from the 
farm it will be impossible to identify where an eventual food safety accident 
originated. In such cases, mitigation of food safety hazards may be a strong driver for 
full traceability and this may require new forms of organizing the supply chain.
Our traceability model enables the analysis of horizontal and vertical network 
effects. Horizontal effects relate to how changes in levels of traceability for one 
ingredient impact the levels of traceability of another ingredient. Vertical network 
effects occur when a change in the contract between two firms in the chain impacts a 
third firm contracting with only one of the initial firms. For example, there is a 
vertical network effect in the supply chain when a decision taken by the third-tier 
firm impacts the levels of traceability and premiums set in the contracts from second-
tier to first-tier firms. Vertical effects can be derived from changes in premiums paid 
by consumers and/or in probabilities of food safety hazards.
To investigate the signs of horizontal and vertical effects, the objective function of 
the third-tier firm is altered to include only one choice variable. The traceability 
levels of the remaining ingredients become fixed and can be treated as parameters. 
Using this modification it is possible to evaluate how the optimal level of traceability 
specified in the contract offered to one of the first-tier firms changes with the level set 
for another firm. This is a horizontal network effect. Similarly, this formulation 
facilitates the interpretation of vertical network effects. Fixing the levels of 
traceability for ingredients 2 and 3, the expected profits of the third-tier firm become
i.e., g11 ¼ g11ðg12; g13; p3;cÞ. The second-order condition for an optimum is
@23
g211
¼ c001111 c002121ðg021Þ2  c0021g00211p3g0021g031p3ðg021Þ2g03
 cL0g0021g03cL00ðg021g03Þ2cL0ðg021Þ2g003c03g0021g03c003ðg021g03Þ2c03ðg021Þ2g003
ð20Þ
Given Assumptions 3, 5, and 7 on the relation between traceability levels across
the supply chain and the proprieties of the cost and liability loss functions,
expression 19 can be simplified and signed as
@23
g211
¼ c0011  c0021ðg021Þ2  cL00ðg021g03Þ2  c003ðg021g03Þ2o0 ð21Þ
Because the second-order condition for an optimum is verified by the implicit
function theorem, the necessary condition defines the optimal level of traceability
written in a contract with firm 1 in the first tier. From this expression, we can do
comparative statics analysis. A horizontal network effect is a change in the level of
traceability specified in the contract of one of the first-tier firms, when the level of
traceability set for another firm changes. The result below presents the horizontal
network effect of the impact of a change in the traceability level for firm 2 in the first
tier on the traceability level set for firm 1 in the same tier.
@g11ðg12; g13;p3;cÞ
@g12
¼ ðp3cL
0  c0Þð@2g3

@g11@g12Þg021g033  ðcL001c003Þ@g3=@g11@g3=@g12
c0011  c0021ðg021Þ2 cL00ðg021@g3=@g11Þ2  c003ðg021@g3=@g11Þ2
ð22Þ
The denominator is the second-order condition and is therefore negative. In the
numerator, the term @2g3=@g11@g12 is the cross-partial effect of changes in the
traceability level from firm 1 in the first tier on the third-tier firm’s traceability level,
when the traceability levels set for the second firm in the first tier also changes. By
Assumption 3 on the linearity of the traceability function, this cross-partial must be
zero; thus the sign of the numerator solely depends on the second term. Recall that,
by Assumptions 5 and 7, both the loss and cost functions are convex. Thus, the
numerator is also negative and the horizontal network effect is positive. If the level of
traceability in the contract for any first-tier firm changes, then the levels of
traceability that other first-tier firms must provide will change in the same direction.
This is an unanticipated result. It would be expected that depending on whether
traceability levels are substitutes, complements, or independent, horizontal network
effects would be, respectively, negative, positive, or zero. The result shows that
traceability levels across different ingredients are complementary. It suggests that in
multi-ingredient supply chains traceability levels will not increase for one ingredient
alone, which may indicate that the response to a requirement for more traceability
will be somewhat inelastic.
The vertical effects in the model result from a change in the premium and in the
probability of a food safety hazard. These are network effects because they indirectly
impact the level of traceability (and corresponding premium) offered to the first-tier
firm producing ingredient 1, when the third-tier firm is affected by exogenous factors.
The vertical network effect of changes in the premium paid by consumers is
@g11ðg12; g13; p3;cÞ
@p3
¼  g
0
21@g3=@g11
c0011  c0021ðg021Þ2  cL00ðg021@g3=@g11Þ2  c003ðg021@g3=@g11Þ2
ð23Þ
In this expression, the denominator is the second-order condition, which by
Equation (21) is negative. By Assumption 3 on the traceability functions, the
numerator is positive therefore the sign of the fraction is negative. However, the sign
of this result is the opposite of the sign of the fraction and thus is positive. This result
suggests that the higher the premium for traceability consumers are willing to pay,
the more traceability is required from upstream firms. Thus, this vertical network
effect is positive. The importance of this result is that to have additional levels of
traceability in a multi-ingredient supply chains it suffices to motivate the leader of
the chain.
The impact of a change in the probability of a food safety hazard on the level of
traceability demanded from the first-tier firm producing the ingredient is
@g11ðg12; g13; p3;cÞ
@c
¼ L
0g021@g3=@g11
c0011  c0021ðg021Þ2  cL00ðg021@g3=@g11Þ2  c003ðg021@g3=@g11Þ2
ð24Þ
As in Expression 23, the denominator is the second-order condition and has a
negative sign. To sign the numerator, recall that from Assumption 3 the traceability
functions are increasing in levels of traceability, whereas from Assumption 7 the loss
function is decreasing, thus the sign of the numerator is also negative. Because two
negatives become a positive, this vertical network effect is also positive. Thus, more
precise traceability information is expected from each ingredient as the probability of
a food safety hazard in a multi-ingredient product increases and to the extent that
traceability mitigates the ex-post consequences of these hazards.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We present a formal network model to analyze interfirm voluntary traceability
systems for multi-ingredient foods. Its formulation draws on vertical control and
agency theories to analyze traceability adoption along a multi-ingredient food chain
as a coordination and institutional problem. The model is used to analyze
traceability adoption in a supply chain with three tiers producing a final output
composed of n ingredients. The third-tier firm contracts for traceability from
upstream firms in response to consumer willingness to pay and/or the opportunity to
mitigate food safety losses. To implement traceability this firm must take into
account the costs incurred by each firm in the supply chain. The model also takes the
important steps of defining traceability as a continuum of information rather than a
yes or no decision and recognizing possible heterogeneity in traceability needs across
the depth (tiers), breadth (number of ingredients), and precision of information
required in multi-ingredient supply chains.
Full traceability is defined as the existence of a vertical and downstream flow of
information from every firm in the first tier, through second-tier firms to a third-tier
firm selling a multi-ingredient product to consumers. Full traceability is feasible if
General Principles and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food
Safety Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety. Official Journal
of the European Communities, L31, 1–24.
the marginal benefits of having traceability for each ingredient outweigh the 
marginal costs incurred by each firm in the food chain. Partial traceability adoption, 
in which the third-tier firm only contracts for traceability on a limited number of 
ingredients, may result in considerable savings and responds to the fact that some of 
the ingredients composing a multi-ingredient food may have very limited 
probabilities of food safety hazards or enter into the final product in small 
proportions, resulting in lower benefits than costs from traceability.
Our model is suited to investigate both horizontal and vertical network effects. The 
analysis suggests that the horizontal network effects of traceability are always positive, 
implying that traceability levels are complements across the ingredients composing the 
output of the third-tier firm. Vertical network effects result from changes in 
traceability premiums paid by consumers to the third-tier firm and in the probabilities 
of food safety hazards. Vertical effects are positive if consumers’ willingness to pay for 
traceability increases or the probabilities of food safety hazards increase.
A possible extension of our work would consider different representations of multi-
ingredient supply chains. Simulations may provide additional insights into how 
incentives for partial and full traceability impact its adoption and the extent of network 
effects. Another approach to future research is to explore the parameterization of the 
probabilities of food safety hazards for each ingredient to analyze criteria for the 
decision of which ingredients to trace in the case of partial traceability adoption.
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